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human action and agency
Scientific explanation is generally understood
to be causal explanation, such that all causes
are thought to have effects and all effects are
thought to have causes. This creates a fundamental problem for any discussion of human
action and agency, where these are understood
in terms of a human capacity to initiate new
causal chains. Specifically, on the one hand we
suppose that human agency has causal properties in that human action has effects on the
world; yet on the other hand, we also suppose
that the capacity to initiate new causal chains
cannot itself be the effect of prior causes. That
is, we tend to treat human action and agency as
part of the world's causal order when we
consider the effects of our actions, but then
turn around to deny that human action and
agency are part of the causal order when we
speak of our capacity as agents to act freely.
Thus the problem of agency is to explain how
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human action is both part of the causal d
and simultaneously independent of that o~
r er
Philosophers regard this as the probleo er.
freedom and determinism (for example ;: of
1986: ch. 7).
' agel

Neoclassical approaches
Neoclassical economics approaches the p
.
roblem of agency and actIOn from a methodol
gical individualist perspective, or from the id:
that all action arises out of the choices of
mdlvlduals. Accordmgly, explaining human
action is a matter of explaining individual
choice, where this in turn, as Elster (1989) puts
it, is a matter of explaining Lndividuals' desires
(or preferences) and opportunities (or constraints). For example, consumer behavior is
understood in terms of what people want,
given their resources. Two approaches may be
distinguished. Some neoclassical economists,
following Stigler and Becker (1977), argue that
all people have essentially the same preferences
and desires, so that choice and human action
reduces to differences in opportunities. In this
instance, choice may be said to be determined
by the constraints and opportunities an individual has. Individual action is then explainable as an effect of those factors that cause the
individual to have a particular opportunity set.
However, this means that agency, understood
as the capacity to initiate new causal chains
and act freely, is not explained.
Other neoclassical economists allow that
individuals' desires and preferences differ, but
this does not make it possible to explain how
choice may freely originate. On the standard
view, the formal , axiomatic representation of
individual objective functions fully explains the
content and structure of individual desires and
the preferences they generate. Thus, for any
given set of opportunities, there is always a
determinate response on the part of the
individual, explainable in terms of that individual's desire/preference structure. That is, an
individual's desires cause the "choice" an
individual makes. In comparison to the
Stigler- Becker view, where opportunities dictate choice, on this view desires and prefer-
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dictate choice.
given an opportunity set,
. .
both views, however, chOIce IS caused by
00 ething else - nameIy, deSlres
.
or opportusom s _ and individuals only fail to behave as
ue
m
··f
,".
I"
the theory pred
letS
I th ey ~re ,l:ratlOna.
rhus while, on the neoclassical View, social
·ence explanation conforms to the standard
SCI
. d oes not proVI·de an
use-and-effect mo d e,I It
cacc
. an d agency.
of
human
action
ount
a Of course, the classic philosophical problem
of freedom and determinism will not be solved
in the work of social sCientists; but, given the
belief that human agency IS a real dimensIOn of
economic life (equally presupposed by neoclassical and heterodox economists), adequate
social science requires analysis that allows for
the possibility of free action in human affairs.
Heterodox economists thus strive to explain
the economy in terms that account for how
action can be relatively independent of causal
frameworks in which it occurs. Two principal
approaches can be distinguished.
eO ces,

A post-Keynesian non-ergodic world

post-Keynesianism, especially as it emphasizes
Keynes on true uncertainty, rejects the neoclassical assumption that the world is ergodic.
To say that the wo~ld is ergodic is to say that its
laws or basic causal relationships are unchanging. Thus, neoclassical economists focus on
risk rather than uncertainty because, unlike
post-Keynesians, they suppose that the probability distributions of future events are settled
and knowable. Post-Keynesians hold that an
economy's causal relationships may change,
that consequently the probability distributions
of future events are generally not knowable,
and that uncertainty, not risk, needs to be
incorporated into expectation formation.
Moreover, the reason that post-Keynesians
hold these propositions is that they believe
economic reality is transmutable, that is, that it
may be transformed by human action (Davidson 1996).
This understanding clearly does provide an
account of agency lacking in neoclassicism. On
the neoclassical view, individuals' actions are
fully explainable in terms of prior causes.

Empirical research aims at uncovering the
arguments (preferences) in utility functions,
on the assumption that these same arguments
will dictate like future behavior in a world
disturbed only by "exogenous shocks." On the
post-Keynesian view, knowing individuals' past
choices is only a partial guide to future
behavior, and individuals need to be understood as agents that have the power to initiate
new causal chains of events.
There are two rationales behind the postKeynesian view. First, in a transmutable world
- one that is historical and path-dependent change in the objects of choice is necessarily
associated with change in preferences. One
cannot prefer A to B in a world in which A and
B no longer exist, but A' and 13' do. What
explains the capacity of individuals to form
new preferences? Though an answer to this
question falls beyond the scope of political
economy, it may nonetheless be said that the
element of indeterminacy this capacity introduces is fully compatible with saying that
individuals act as free agents. Second, in a
transmutable world, human action changes the
future. This implies that past events fail to
dictate future events when human agency
intervenes. Thus, seeing the world as nonergodic is a direct demonstration of a capacity
for free action.
Marxian and feminist views on agency

Marxism provides another type of approach to
explaining human action and agency. Classical
Marxism is associated with basesuperstructure explanations in which it is
argued that developments in a society's economic base, understood in terms of the forces
and relations of production, ramify through to
changes in its superstructure, understood in
terms of that society's politics, culture and
property relations. Thus development in the
former, broadly speaking, causes developments
in the latter, though with lags and reverse
repercussions. This analysis has led some
commentators to argue mistakenly that Marxist views of history are deterministic in the
sense that an inescapable logic dictates the
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human capital
course of events. A more accurate conception
involves saying that broad patterns of historical
development, especially as reflecting the evolution of the modes of production and social
formations, account for the general pattern of
events. Where does human agency, then, come
into this picture?
Marx's class analysis characterized the
proletariat as the universal class in the sense
of being that class with no attachment to either
capitalism or class society per se. In his view,
this unique status enabled working people to
understand the nature of EXPLOITATION, social
forces, and generally the factors that caused
them to act as wage laborers. However, this
understanding also had a revolutionizing effect
in that it gave them a further capacity to step
outside of the causal framework of their lives.
Revolutionary action, then, was free action for
Marx, and the working class was a genuine
agent of historical change. Though history
might move in broad patterns, how it was
played out at particular points of time and in
specific arenas was due to free activity tied
specifically to consciousness of that history.
For Marx, of course, classes, and individuals, to the extent that they act with class
consciousness, are society's agents. However,
Marx's general model of agency has been
adopted by other heterodox thinkers for
different types of agents. Feminists, for example, also hold that gaining an understanding of
the causal frameworks in which individuals
generally operate creates a capacity to act freely
and overcome those frameworks, when they
argue that women who develop an understanding of patriarchal society may transcend
patriarchal relationships, and help others to do
so as welL We might thus emphasize Marx's
general approach as a dialectical one in
assuming that a causal process may itself bring
forth breaks in a causal order, here due
specifically to the emergence of human agency.

strategies for explaining .agency. Ironical1y,
neoclaSSical econorrucs, which begins with ~
methodological individualist postulate that all
actions derives from individuals, lacks a cl
means of arguing that individuals are in~
agents in the sense of initiating causal
quences. This would seem to be an impon::
deficiency, since explaining the world in caUSeand-effect terms ought not exclude that set of
(initiating) causes due to human action and
agency.

See also:
Austrian school of political economy; dialectical method; feminist poli~cal economy: major
contemporary themes; holistic method; indivi.
dual and society; institutions and habits.
Marxist political economy: . contemporar;
vanetles; methodological mdlVldualism and
collectivism; neoclassical economics; post-Key.
nesian political economy: major contemporary
themes
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Conclusion
Heterodox economists, therefore, place important emphasis on having accounts of human
action, and yet also work with different
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Human capital refers to the broad range of
knowledge and skills possessed by individuals,
making it possible for them to produce goods
and services. As with physical capital, human

